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NOTES AND COMMENTS
COMPULSORY PHYsIcAL EXAMINATION

OF PLAnqrwi- N

PERSONAL INJURY CASES

Whether or not a plaintiff in a personal injury action can be compelled to submit to a physical examination upon defendant's motion,
so as to demonstrate the nature and scope of the injuries, if any, is a
much controverted issue before the bench and bar of Illinois. As neither
the Civil Practice Act nor the Rules of the Supreme Court make any
specific provision for this type of discovery to aid the defendant, any
discussion of the problem necessarily resolves itself into an investigation
as to whether or not common-law courts possessed that power as an
inherent part of their jurisdiction so that it may be said to inure in our
constitutional nisi prius courts.
Some of the earlier American cases which deny the right to such
examination state that it was contrary to the procedure at common
law,' but these declarations are of dubious value. Careful investigation
shows that compulsory physical examination was recognized at common
law, for, in cases involving the determination of heirship where posthumous issue was anticipated, the writ De Ventre Inspiciendo2 might
issue.3 In the ecclesiastical courts, where annulment of marriage was
sought on the ground of impotency, examination of the parties by medical
experts was the common practice. 4 Moreover, the early records abound
with illustrations of maimed and wounded victims exhibiting their injuries to grand and petit juries. 5 Scarcely a criminal case was tried in
which the defendant was not compelled to rise so that he might be
identified by the witnesses, a compulsory form of inspection of his person
which even his efforts at disguise would not prevent.8 It is not surprising,
1 Parker v. Enslow, 102 IlM.272 (1882); Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141
U. S. 250, 11 S. Ct. 1000, 35 L. Ed. 734 (1891); Camden & Suburban Ry. Co. v.
Stetson, 177 U. S. 172, 20 S. Ct. 617, 44 L. Ed. 721 (1900).
2 Bouvier, 8th Ed., defines such writ as: "A writ to inspect the body where a
woman feigns to be pregnant, to see whether she is with child."
3 See, for example, Lady Willoughby's Case, Moore (K.B.) 523, 72 Eng. Rep. 733
(1596); Theaker's Case, Cro. Jac. 686, 79 Eng. Rep. 595 (1624). For an illustration
of its use in the United States, see State v. Arden, 1 Bay (S. Car.) 487 (1795).
4 See, for example, N-r v. M-e, 2 Rob. Ecc. 625, 163 Eng. Rep. 1435 (1853).
5 Illustrations may be found in Select Pleas of the Crown (A.D. 1200-1225), 1
Selden Society, p. 2, case 4; p. 5, case 11; and p. 11, case 27. The value of such
examinations is disclosed by ibid., p. 9, case 23, where an appeal for housebreaking and maiming collapsed because it appeared the wound was of more
recent date than that alleged in the charge.
6 See Trial of Capt. Thomas Vaughan, 13 Howell's State Trials 485 (1696), in
which defendant was compelled to remove a wig so that the natural color of his
hair could be ascertained. For a collection of cases dealing with the physical
examination of the defendant in a criminal case, see People v. Corder, 244 Mich.
274, 221 N. W. 309 (1928).
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therefore, to find at least one prominent authority stating 7that compulsory physical examination was recognized at common law.
Other jurisdictions, beside Illinois, have been confronted with this
same problem and have achieved variant results. It is particularly interesting and enlightening to note the manner in which the Federal
courts have dealt with the issue. Prior to the passage of the Federal
statute which authorized the United States Supreme Court to adopt
rules of procedure, 8 it was held that no power existed in the Federal
courts to compel a person suing for personal injuries to submit to a
medical examination. The majority opinion in Union Pacific Railway
Company v. Botsford,9 long the leading case on the subject, states:
"The order moved for, subjecting the plaintiff's person to examination
by a surgeon, without her consent and in advance of trial, was not
according to the common law, to common usage or to the statutes of
the United States."' 10 Though the right to the inviolability of the person
seemed to influence the majority, the assumption that there was no
common-law authority for such practice must also have carried some
weight." Mr. Justice Brewer, however, wrote a vigorous dissent in
which he said: "The end of litigation is justice. Knowledge of the truth
12
is essential thereto."'
The Botsford case continued to be the rule of the federal courts
until the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Pursuant
to congressional authority given in 1933, the United States Supreme
Court adopted Rule 35 which empowers the court to order such an
examination. 13 Since then, there has been little doubt that the federal
courts have the power, in a proper case, to order a party plaintiff
to submit to such a physical examination and they have not hesitated to
use it. The case of Beach v. Beach,14 and the more recent case of
Sibbach v. Wilson & Company, Inc., 15 serve to illustrate the use that
may be made of such power. Though the Botsford case indicated that
the plaintiff's right to be free from involuntary examination was a sub7

Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Ed., § 2220.

8 28 U. S. C. A. § 723c.

9 141 U. S. 250, 11 S. Ct. 1000, 35 L. Ed. 734 (1891).
10 141 U. S. 250 at 257, 11 S. Ct. 1000 at 1003, 35 L. Ed. 734 at 740.
11 The court cited an Illinois case, Parker v. Enslow, 102 Ill. 272 (1882.), which
case contains statements to that effect and may have had some influence upon
the decision.
12 141 U. S. 250 at 258, 11 S. Ct. 1000 at 1003, 35 L. Ed. 734 at 740.
Is Rule 35 provides: "In an action in which the mental or physical condition of
a party is in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may order him
to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician. The order may be
made only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the party to be
examined and to all other parties and shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and the person or persons by whom it is to
be made." 28 U. S. C. A. following 723c.
14 114 F. (2d) 479 (1940), noted in 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REvi-mw 198.
15 312 U. S. 1, 61 S. Ct. 422, 85 L. Ed. 479 (1941), reversing 108 F. (2d) 415 (1939).
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stantial one,' 8 the rationale of the Sibbach case necessarily treats the
problem as one of procedural cognizance, for the only authority given to
the United States Supreme Court was to adopt rules of "procedure." It
would follow, therefore, that any court possessing rule-making power
could deal with the problem without the aid of legislation.
Despite the earlier Federal rule, the great weight of authority
throughout the states supports the proposition that courts have the inherent power to order a reasonable physical examination of a plaintiff
in a personal injury action.' 7 One of the earliest cases adhering to such
view is Schroeder v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company, 18 in which the Iowa court held that it had such power in the interest
of exact justice. The court there stated: "Whoever is a party to an action in a court. . .has a right to demand therein the administration of
exact justice. This right can only be secured and fully respected by
obtaining the exact and full truth touching all matters in issue in the
action. If truth be hidden, injustice will be done. The right of the suitor,
then, to demand the whole truth is unquestioned; it is the correlative of the right to exact justice. It is true, indeed, that on account of
the imperfections incident to human nature perfect truth may not always
be attained, and it is well understood that exact justice cannot, because
of the inability of courts to obtain truth in entire fullness, be always
administered. We are often compelled to accept approximate justice
as the best that courts can do in the administration of the law. But
while the law is satisfied with approximate justice where exact justice
cannot be attained, the court should recognize no rules which stop at the
first when the second is in reach."' 9 The arguments advanced by the
Iowa court are certainly cogent when compared to those advanced by the
courts adhering to the minority view.
The Illinois case law on the subject, of paramount importance to
us, rests primarily upon the decision in Parker v. Enslow,20 which
denied that a court of this state has the power to make and enforce an
order for a physical examination. The court there said: "Complaint is
also made that the court refused to compel appellee to submit his eyes
to the examination of a physician in the presence of the jury. There was
no error in this. The court had no power to make or enforce such an
order." 2 ' Though no explanation was given, it should be noted that the
Is Being matter of substance, legislation would be necessary to remove it.
17 See cases listed in 17 Am. Jur., Discovery, § 55; 18 C. J., Discovery, § 100;
25 C. J. S., Damages, § 174; 108 A. L. R. 142. Contra: Parker v. Enslow, 102 III.
272 (1882); Joliet St. Ry. Co. v. Caul, 143 Ill. 177, 32 N.E. 389 (1892); Union Pacific
Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250, 11 S. Ct. 1000, 35 L. Ed. 734 (1891); Camden &
Suburban Ry. Co. v. Stetson, 177 U. S. 172, 20 S. Ct. 617, 44 L. Ed. 721 (1900);
Stack v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 177 Mass. 155, 58 N. E. 686, 52 L. R. A. 328
(1900); McQuigan v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 129 N. Y. 50, 29 N. E. 235, 14
L. R.A. 466 (1891).
18 47 Iowa 375 (1877).
19 47 Iowa 375 at 379.
20 102 Ill.
272 (1882).
21 102 Ill.
272 at 279.
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requested examination was to be made in the presence of the jury.
The court might well have held this to be improper, without resorting to
the broader ground that the court had no power to grant the motion.
22
In any event, the ruling therein was followed in subsequent cases. As
improper
as
regarded
been
it
has
rule,
a necessary corollary to such
for defendant's counsel, on cross-examination, to ask plaintiff if he or
she would be willing to submit to a physical examination. 23 It has likewise been held that it is prejudicial error for plaintiff's attorney to argue
to the jury that defendant could have had the plaintiff examined had he
seen fit, for such statements clearly constitute a misstatement of the
law. 24 In arriving at this last holding, the court used rather strong
language indicating that legislation would be required before examination was possible. It there said: "There is no law under which the
court could direct or control such an examination, and, until the people
of this State, acting through their representatives in the General Assembly, determine that the administration of justice requires that such
authority be vested in the courts, defendants in personal injury actions
25
will not be permitted to do indirectly what they cannot do directly."
The most recent pronouncement on this subject by the Supreme
Court of Illinois was made in the case of Chicago, Rock Island &
Pacific Railway Company v. Benson,26 in which case, during the trial
and out of the presence of the jury, defendant's counsel moved to have
plaintiff examined by a doctor in the presence of plaintiff's doctors and
under the direction of the court. The motion was denied and error was
predicated on such ruling. On this point the court said: "While it would
seem that there might be some good reasons advanced for a contrary
rule. . .it was the settled law of this State that the plaintiff in an action
of this kind could not be required to submit to a physical examination
as to his injuries. . . To this rule we now adhere." 27 No matter what
common-law authority our courts may have possessed on this point, the
tenor of these decisions indicates they do not now possess it. It should be
remembered, however, that although it appears unlikely that the Illinois Supreme Court will alter its views, still all of the Illinois decisions
on the subject were rendered prior to the passage of the Illinois Civil
Practice Act.
There is no statute in Illinois which expressly grants the power to
order a compulsory physical examination, but is there any statute which
authorizes such by implication? In this regard it might be noted that
22 St. Louis Bridge Co. v. Miller, 138 Ill. 465, 28 N. E. 1091 (1891); Joliet St.
Ry. Co. v. Caul, 143 Ill. 177, 32 N. E. 389 (1892); Peoria, Decatur & Evansville
Ry. Co. v. Rice, 144 Ill. 227, 33 N. E. 951 (1893); People v. Scott, 326 IM. 327,
157 N. E. 247 (1927).
23 City of Chicago v. McNally, 227 Ill. 14, 81 N. E. 23 (1907).
24 Mattice v. Klawans, 312 Ill. 299, 143 N. E. 866 (1924).
25 312 Ill. 299 at 307, 143 N. E. 866 at 869.
26 352 IM1.
195, 185 N. E. 244 (1933).
27 352 Ill. 195 at 201, 185 N. E. 244 at 247.
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Section 2 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act confers upon the Supreme
Court the power to make rules "supplementary to but not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act."128 If one is willing to accept the premise
of the Sibbach case that such a matter is but one of procedure, the
authority of Section 2 would seem to be broad enough to warrant the
Supreme Court promulgating a rule on the subject. This is particularly
true when Section 4 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act 29 is also taken into
consideration. The most persuasive argument advanced against such
reasoning is the fact that a negative vote on the whole Act was feared
unless the provision for compulsory physical examination was dropped
from the tentative draft thereof prior to its submission to the legislature.
Subsequent amendments made to the discovery provisions of the Act
might indicate a legislative purpose not to confer power over this subject on the courts, 3 0 so that any rule it might make would be open to
the charge that it was "inconsistent with" and not "supplementary to"
the provisions of the statute.
But the underlying philosophy of the Civil Practice Act, however,
might well warrant adoption of such a rule, for when exercised under
proper court supervision, it is as proper a method of ascertaining the
truth as are the provisions for the production of documents, the taking
of pre-trial discovery from the parties, and the like, all of which are
designed to aid a party to get the true facts prior to trial.
When a plaintiff submits his cause to the court, he consents to all
reasonable rules of the particular tribunal. If he chooses to sue in the
courts of the United States, he must, now, under the rules thereof,
submit to physical examination or face the dismissal of his suit. If he
is an injured employee seeking compensation, he must, by reason of the
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, undergo a physical examination. 3' The claim that such examination invades his right of inviolability of person is answered by the words of an Iowa court which
once said: "As to indignity to which an examination would have subjected him. . .it is probably more imaginary than real."13 2 If, as Mr.
Justice Brewer said, the end of litigation is justice, then knowledge of the
D. A. EsLiNG
full truth is essential.
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, CI. 110, § 126.
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 128.
30 The revisions and additions made in 1941, see Laws 1941, II, 465-6, Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, §§ 181-2a, were all made subject to such rules as might be
adopted to make the revisions effective. The Supreme Court exercised the power,
28

29

see Rules 15, 16 and 23A in 378 Ill. 10-2.
81 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 48, § 149.
82

Schroeder v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 47 Iowa 375 at 382 (1877).

